Wednesday, April 21, 2010

What Should The President Say On Thursday?

via The Baseline Scenario by Simon Johnson on 4/21/10

By Simon Johnson, co-author of 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and The Next Financial Meltdown
On Thursday, President Obama will give one of the defining speeches of his presidency.  Most presidents are remembered for only 2 or 3 policies or events during their tenure.  The SEC case against Goldman Sachs means, like it or not, the legacy of this administration is wrapped up with the outcome of this and related cases.
The president is apparently lining up to give a fairly conventional "support the Dodd bill" speech.  This would be major miscalculation.
The Democrats are afraid that if they truly take on the big banks, they will lose campaign contributions and be placed a major disadvantage for November 2010 and 2012 – "don't push it too far" is the message from the White House to the Senate.  But this just shows the White House has not fully comprehended the modern nature of banking.
The banks are already coming after the Democrats.  A pro-big bank group launched advertizing yesterday against Harry Reid in Nevada, as well as in Missouri and Virginia; the media spend is eye popping.  Neal Wolin (Deputy Treasury Secretary) already declared war on the Chamber of Commerce over consumer protection; the people behind the Chamber are not nice people and they are very angry about what they think will hurt their interests.
If you want to rally the country against oversized banks that serve no productive purpose, you need to really end the Too Big To Fail problem – half measures simply will not convince people or rally sufficient support.  And what we have so far is half measures, as understood from left and right – see today's New York Times – because the "resolution authority" simply cannot work for large complex cross-border financial institutions. 
It will help manage the failure – and avoid bailouts – at purely domestic US financial institutions, but it does not help for cross-border institutions because there is no international agreement on how to handle such failures and – I can assure you – there is no prospect for such an agreement in at least the next 20 years.  The Dodd bill will help for resolving bank holding companies and for nonbank financial companies, but not for the megabanks.
How can you take on the banks – whose executives are out for revenge because of the consumer protection measures and because of what seems likely to happen on derivatives, and just to show they are still the top dog (e.g., Goldman) – with one hand tied behind your back in November?
What you would like to do is say: look, we had an up or down vote on whether to break-up the biggest banks and my opponent (or his/her party) was steadfastly opposed.  You would want the president to state, in his clearest and loudest voice: There is no social value to having banks above $100 billion in total assets and we all now understand the danger of allowing banks to become 10 times that size – let alone entering the $2-$3 trillion range; we will gradually and responsibly force our biggest banks to become smaller.  This worked for Standard Oil – no one can claim it hurt the oil industry.  And who would really want to go back to having AT&T run a monopoly in any part of telecommunications?
What about the campaign contributions?  If confronted on these terms, the top executives of the six megabanks, without question, would spend more money defeating Democrats.  But that is exactly the issue you should take to the country.  And it's only six banks.
Show people, in gruesome detail, the money being spent by this part of big finance.  Go to the nonfinancial sector, to other parts of the financial system, and directly to individuals – asking most clearly for contributions that would replace what the banks have withdrawn and offset what the banks are spending to defeat the president's reform agenda.
Of course, people may choose not to support this effort.  They are busy – and everyone has many distractions.  Perhaps even the president cannot break through the daily clutter of information and ideas on this issue.  But at least he should make a clear and determined effort – by putting the bank size issues accurately in stark and simple terms.
And if people still refuse to come on board, that's fine.  But then they shouldn't complain so loudly as the big banks propel us all towards a Second Great Depression.

Friday, April 16, 2010

Senate Finance (Derivatives) Reform Bill

section by section summary:
http://ag.senate.gov/site/ComLeg/WSTAA 20Section 20by 20Section.pdf

Michael Lewis's Complete Guide To Who's Who In The CDO Scandal

via Clusterstock by Courtney Comstock on 4/16/10

michael lewisThe huge SEC case against Goldman and Fabrice Tourre has brought the spotlight back on the mortgage crisis.
Tourre allegedly packaged CDOs filled with very risky mortgage bonds and then marketed them to investors by telling them that Paulson was also long them. He wasn't.
Michael Lewis's book, The Big Short, explains very well what happened during the crisis - who was long, who was short, and how they did it.
Take a quick refresher to remind yourself what exactly happened and you'll better understand the charges against Tourre.

Meet the characters here >

The wanna-be homeowner

The wanna-be homeowner
The average American cannot afford a house without a mortgage.
So they go to a bank and get a loan. In some cases, it's by talking to someone who works for...


The mortgage originator

The mortgage originator
This is Mark Ernst, the CEO of Option One, the mortgage originator owned by H&R Block. They made the loans to home owners and sold them to Wall Street.
The company announced a surprising loss in its portfolio of subprime mortgage loans first in June 2006.
After, in a speech about Option One's subprime loan portfolio, he said they had recovered and were expecting a 5% loss rate on its loans from there on out. Someone stood up and basically said, you're completely wrong. He was. He resigned in November 2007.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


They ran subprime lending

They ran subprime lending
This is David Wells, who ran subprime lending for a company called Fremont Investment & Loan.
In September 2008, Fremont would announce that 30% of its subprime loans were in default. Its pools of loans would register higher losses than that. Even after Fremont sold the houses it foreclosed upon, it was out nearly half the money it loaned.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The loan buyers

The loan buyers
Every bank on Wall Street bought the loans from the mortgage originators, packaged them into bonds, and sometimes repackaged them into CDOs.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The enablers. AKA the rating agencies.

The enablers. AKA the rating agencies.
After buying the loans, Wall Street asked the rating agencies to rate them in bundles of bonds.
This Deven Sharma, the President of Standard & Poors, a ratings agency.
Working for him is Ernestine Warner, who is an analyst in the surveillance department at S&P's, which was meant to monitor subprime bonds and downgrade them if the loans that underpinned them went bad. They didn't monitor them because they lacked relevant information about the bonds because, she said, her bank clients, the issuers of the bonds, wouldn't give it to her.
In the end, the ratings agencies, presented with the pile of bonds backed by dubious loans, would pronounce 80% of the bonds in it triple-A. These bonds could then be sold to investors-- pension funds, insurance companies and...
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The investor. AKA the loser

The investor. AKA the loser
John Devaney ran a hedge fund that invested in subprime mortgage bonds, United Capital Markets. He bought the subprime bonds from Wall Street firms.
He wrote in a letter released over the PR Newswire in 2007, "I was long in 2007 and I was wrong."
He had to sell his yacht, his plane, and his Renoir after the market crashed.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The end buyer AKA the sucker

The end buyer AKA the sucker
The end buyer of CDOs were CDO managers like Wing Chau, President and founder of Harding Advisory, which would become the world's biggest subprime CDO manager.
It was his job to buy the subprime bonds that served as collateral for CDO investors, like hedge fund manager John Devaney, who we introduced you to in the last slide.
Big investors hired him to vet the bonds. So it was also his job to monitor the hundred or so individual subprime bonds inside each CDO and replace the bad ones, before they went bad, with better ones.
(All by himself, Wing Chau generated vast demand for the riskiest subprime mortgage bonds, for which there had been essentially no demand. This demand led to the supply of new home loans, as material for the bonds.)
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The doomsayers. The guys who predicted the crash AKA the winners

The doomsayers. The guys who predicted the crash AKA the winners
Michael Burry
Image: nymag
It was those types of end-buyers we just mentioned that the stars of the subprime mortgage crisis (the best known is John Paulson) bet against.
The first to see what was actually inside these CDOs (the very risky subprime bonds that John Devaney was buying and the CDO manager was "vetting") was this guy, Michael Burry. He saw it in 2005.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


Many more followed in his footsteps, like John Paulson

Many more followed in his footsteps, like John Paulson


and Kyle Bass

and Kyle Bass
Kyle Bass, John Paulson, Greg Lippman, Steve Eisman, and others joined Burry in "the trade of a lifetime."
Lewis focuses on two guys from Cornwall Capital: Jamie Mai and Charlie Ledley. Before this trade, they were virtually unknown. It was kind of perfect because this trade was virtually unknown in 2006.
Burry, Paulson, Bass, and the guys from Cornwall Capital had to ask Wall Street to let them buy CDOs made up of credit default swaps on those bonds, aka the insurance on CDOs made up of subprime bonds.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


Cornwall Capital met David Burt, a guy with great connections on Wall Street

Cornwall Capital met David Burt, a guy with great connections on Wall Street
Before meeting David Burt, a consultant, Cornwall Capital had no way to buy insurance on CDOs of subprime bonds in case the loans became worthless. He connected the "garage band" hedge fund with a woman that would sell Cornwall Capital this insurance.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The CDS seller

The CDS seller
Image: AP
It was Stacey Strauss' job to find investors who wanted to buy credit default swaps from Morgan Stanley.
The synthetic counterpart to CDOs, packages of subprime mortgage bonds, are CDOs made up of credit default swaps on those bonds.
They are insurance on the subprime bonds incase they become worthless. Cornwall bought this insurance from Morgan Stanley (and others, too).
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The doomsayers inside the banks

The doomsayers inside the banks
Then the banks stopped selling insurance on subprime loans and started buying it for themselves (circa 2007).
Andrew Davilman from Goldman Sachs is an example of the people inside the banks who, once they had realized the subprime bonds were worthless, were able to make bets against them (like Michael Burry, Cornwall Capital, and the rest) before the ship went down.
Information thanks to Michael Lewis' new book, The Big Short.


The savior aka TARP

The savior aka TARP
Even though some banks bet against subprime bonds too, it wasn't enough to cover all of their losses.
TARP funds bailed out the banks that were left with tons of unwanted subprime bonds. Most have since paid TARP back.


It is actually much more confusing

It is actually much more confusing
Lewis' book provides a more in-depth breakdown of what happened and who was involved.
If you're interested in learning more, you can buy it here.
You should also check out 10 myths about the subprime crisis -->
And our minute-to-minute guide to the SEC's case against Goldman and Fabrice Tourre -->

SEC complaint filed Against Goldman Sachs

http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf

The US Leveraged Loan Market

a day in the life of an investment banking analyst

Monday, April 12, 2010

Despite NBER Statement, Recession Is Likely Over

Despite NBER Statement, Recession Is Likely Over


This morning the National Bureau of Economic Research's Business Cycle Dating Committee released a statement, which said that it's premature to declare the recession that started in December 2007 is over, but that doesn't mean we're still in a recession.


First a little background: the committee is considered the official arbiter of when U.S. recessions begin and end. Currently, there are seven economists who serve on the nonpartisan, nonprofit group, which was formed in 1978, though the NBER has been dating recessions since 1929. The NBER doesn't define a recession in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP, a definition that is often cited as a rule of thumb. Rather, a recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.
Since the definition of recession takes so many factors into account, the committee often takes its time to determine the end date. It didn't officially declare until July 2003 that the 2001 recession, which ran from March to November of that year, was over.
The committee's dating procedure is basically an academic exercise and it is more concerned with accuracy than speed. Though signs are looking up for the economy and most economists think the recession ended sometime in the middle of last year, broad risks remain. GDP began to grow again in the middle of last year, but fourth quarter GDP was still 2% below the peak it registered in 2008, adjusting for inflation. Meanwhile, last month the economy posted a big gain in jobs, but those numbers remain preliminary and could be revised.
Think of the committee as an oncologist treating a cancer patient. The preliminary tests may look good, but until the final results of the MRI come in, you don't want to declare that the cancer has been totally eliminated.